When was Negotiations Broken?

Part of the Japanese plan for the attack included breaking off negotiations with the United States 30 minutes before the attack began. 

Diplomats from the Japanese Embassy in Washington, including the Japanese Ambassador, Admiral Kichisaburo Nomura, and special representative Saburo Kurusu, had been conducting extended talks with the State Department regarding the U.S. reactions to the Japanese move into Việt Nam in the summer.

What do you know about when the negotiations were broken?  Negotiate this quick quiz.

True or False?

1. The long 14-part message was not suppose to be delivered to the American government.

2. The last part of the 14-part message arrived late Saturday night (Washington time).

3. The United States was unable to decoded the message.

4. General George Marshall, Army Chief of Staff, sent that morning's warning message.

5. There were delays in the message sent to Hawaii because of trouble with the Army's long distance communication system.

6. The two-line declaration of war was finally delivered to U.S. Ambassador Grew in Tokyo about 10 hours after the attack was over.

Answers

1. False. In the days before the attack, a long 14-part message was sent to the Embassy from the Foreign Office in Tokyo (encrypted with the Type 97 cryptographic machine, in a cipher named PURPLE by U.S. cryptanalysts), with instructions to deliver it to Secretary of State Cordell Hull at 1 p.m. Washington time.

2. True. The last part arrived late Saturday night (Washington time) but due to decryption and typing delays, and to Tokyo's failure to stress the crucial necessity of the timing, her Embassy personnel did not deliver the message breaking off negotiations to Secretary Hull until several hours after the attack.

3. False. The United States had decrypted the 14th part well before the Japanese Embassy managed to, and long before the Embassy managed a fair typed copy. The final part, with its instruction for the time of delivery, had been decoded that night, but was not delivered until the next morning; according to Henry Clausen, who also denied the claim by Rufus S. Bratton that General Marshall couldn't be found (as he was out for a morning horseback ride).

4. False. It prompted General George Marshall, Army Chief of Staff, to send that morning's warning message, with assurances that it would be received by all recipients by 1 pm Washington time.

5. True. There were delays in the message sent to Hawaii because of trouble with the Army's long distance communication system, a decision not to use the Navy's parallel facilities despite an offer to permit it, and various troubles during its travels over commercial cable facilities (somehow its "urgent" marking was misplaced, adding additional hours to its travel time). It was actually delivered to General Walter Short, by a young Japanese-American cycle messenger, several hours after the attack had ended.

6. True. There were Japanese records, admitted into evidence during Congressional hearings on the attack after the War, established that the Japanese government had not even written a declaration of war until hearing news of the successful attack. The two-line declaration of war was finally delivered to U.S. Ambassador Grew in Tokyo about 10 hours after the attack was over. He was allowed to transmit it to the United States where it was received late Monday afternoon (Washington time).

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